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1. Introduction 
 
In a standard competitive labour market equilibrium there is no particular incentive 
for job separations to occur, since the workers could not improve their labour market 
position by conducting a switch to another firm from their current matches. In contrast 
to this conjecture, there is a great deal of micro-level evidence on the dynamics of 
labour markets that points out that market economies are in a state of continuous 
turbulence (e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999; Farber, 1999). Flows of workers 
between jobs and between labour market states are large by any reasonable standards.  
 
Search theory and empirical search models typically concentrate on the role of a wage 
in explaining job changes. Another potential reason for the existence of on-the-job 
search is adverse working conditions, which are without doubt a very important 
attribute of a job match. If a wage does not sufficiently compensate for adverse 
working conditions, employees can increase their utility by switching jobs from their 
current ones. Although non-wage job characteristics can be included in search models 
(e.g. Blau, 1991; Hwang, Mortensen, and Reed, 1998; Lang and Majumdar, 2004), 
this possibility has attracted more attention in the empirical work that is less directly 
tied to search models.  
 
Extensive analysis of turnover has been made in human resource management (HRM) 
and personnel psychology, where attention centers on the personnel policies and job 
attitudes of the employees. There is also, however, an increasing interest in economics 
to incorporate information on working conditions and worker attitudes to the analysis 
of turnover. This study contributes to the literature by investigating the interactions 
between adverse working conditions, job satisfaction, and workers’ intentions to quit. 
 
There are empirical studies that have analyzed directly how individual characteristics 
and working conditions or job attributes affect employees’ probability of quitting or 
job duration. Adverse working conditions have been found to increase quits. In most 
of these studies the data on working conditions are not from individual employees’ 
workplaces, but rely on, for example, industry injury rates or work attributes typical 
of different occupations (e.g. Viscusi, 1979; Bartel, 1982; Herzog and Schottman, 
1990; Gronberg and Reed, 1994). However, in some studies workplace-specific 
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attributes are used. For example, Manning (2003) uses information on night shifts to 
explain job duration. 
 
Another strand of the literature explains quits or job durations directly by means of 
job satisfaction scores, the employee’s characteristics, and firm characteristics, but 
without information on job attributes (e.g. Flanagan, Strauss, and Ulman, 1974; 
Freeman, 1978; Clark, Yannis, and Sanfey, 1998; Ward and Sloane, 2000; Clark, 
2001; Lévy-Garboua, Montmarquette, and Simonnett, 2001; Kristensen and 
Westergård-Nielsen, 2004, Johansson, 2004). These studies generally discover that 
dissatisfied workers are more likely to quit their current matches. In other words, the 
self-reported level of job satisfaction is a good predictor for job mobility beyond the 
effect of wages. Working the other way, Akerlof, Rose and Yellen (1988) show that 
job changes lead to an increase in job satisfaction and Altonji and Paxson (1988) 
present evidence that job mobility leads to more satisfactory working hours. 
 
This has also been the approach in the HRM literature, where the relationships of job 
satisfaction, organizational commitment and withdrawal cognitions to turnover have 
been analyzed (e.g. Cotton and Tuttle, 1986; Tett and Meyer, 1993; Griffeth, Hom, 
and Gaertner, 2000), using a variety of characteristics of the employees and firms. 
Variables that describe working conditions have been included in some of these 
studies.  
 
Psychological studies show that the intentions of individuals are good predictors of 
their actual behaviour (e.g. Tett and Meyer, 1993). Accordingly, Kristensen and 
Westergård-Nielsen (2004) report that job search, which is an extreme form of 
intentions to quit, is a good predictor of actual quits. Instead of actual separations, the 
impact of working conditions and/or job satisfaction on quit intentions or job search 
has also been examined some studies in labour economics (van Ophem, 1991; Shields 
and Price, 2002; Sousa-Poza and Henneberger, 2002; García-Serrano, 2004). The 
relationship between job satisfaction and turnover intentions has also been analyzed 
from the psychological perspective (e.g. Hellman, 1997).  
 
Our purpose is to study workers’ intentions to quit using Finnish data. The Finnish 
case is interesting in this respect, because the binding collective labour agreements 
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already contain some pecuniary compensation for adverse working conditions. In 
principle, one could therefore think that working conditions may not matter a lot for 
on-the-job search. However, the apparent heterogeneity of workplaces makes it hard 
for the collective labour agreements to take into account all the relevant aspects of 
working conditions. Thus, workers’ subjective valuations about their working 
conditions can differ greatly from the ones that have been stipulated in the collective 
agreements by the central organizations of employees and employers. Our earlier 
empirical evidence points out that perceived working conditions have a very minor 
role in the determination of individual wages in the Finnish labour market 
(Böckerman and Ilmakunnas, 2004). In contrast, adverse working conditions 
substantially increase the level of job dissatisfaction and the perception of unfairness 
of pay at workplaces. It is therefore interesting to study whether this dissatisfaction 
gives rise to the desire to find another job. 
 
Our study differs from the earlier ones in this field of research in some important 
respects. We have a data set, the Quality of Work Life Survey, that includes not only 
job satisfaction scores, but also detailed information on several different aspects of 
working conditions at the workplace, not just conditions typical of the occupation or 
industry. A drawback of the data set is that it is a single cross-section and therefore 
actual separations cannot be observed. On the other hand, there is a variety of 
information on both perceived job switch intentions and actual job search, so that 
different measures of quit intentions can be compared. 
 
The data make it possible to model the relationships between working conditions, 
satisfaction, and on-the-job search. In the first model, we explain alternative binary 
indicators of quit intentions by individual characteristics, firm characteristics, and 
working conditions. In the second, extended model, we explain binary indicators of 
adverse working conditions by various industry, occupation, and firm variables. A 
binary indicator of job dissatisfaction is then explained by these working conditions 
and the employees’ personal characteristics. Finally, intentions to quit are explained 
by job dissatisfaction, wage, and some other personal characteristics. This model 
forms a system of probit models that have endogenous dummy explanatory variables. 
Since the system is recursive, it can be estimated as a multivariate probit model. This 
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approach is similar to that used by Shields and Price (2002), but they used only one 
indicator of working conditions, racial harassment. 
 
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the modelling 
approaches. Section 3 provides an overview of the data and Section 4 reports the 
estimation results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Modelling approaches 
 
2.1. Explaining intentions to quit with job disamenities 
 
We start with models where we explain a binary indicator of intentions to quit directly 
by means of working conditions. We have several alternative measures for the 
intentions, which are explained in the next section. As explanatory variables we have 
dummy variables that describe various aspects of disamenities and various individual 
and workplace characteristics. The latent intention and its observation rule are 
 
qi* = Ziγ + Xiβ + εi 
qi = 1(qi*>0) 
 
where 1 is an indicator function.1 Z includes job disamenities and X other variables 
and i indexes the employees. The error term ε is assumed to be normally distributed, 
and we use the probit model.  
 
The choice of variables to be included in X is partly determined by arguments from 
the large literature on job search in the labour market (e.g. Eckstein and Van den 
Berg, 2003). While much of the work deals with search when unemployed, there have 
been empirical analyses on-the-job search by Blau (1992), Pissarides and Wadsworth 
(1994), and Manning (2003), among others.  
 
Wage and tenure are the variables that have been given most attention in the 
literature. Search theory gives a prediction that a wage should have a negative impact 
on separations and on-the-job search, since a high current wage means that the worker 
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is unlikely to find an offer with a higher wage. The models also typically predict that 
the probability of quitting decreases with tenure. The reason for this is that longer 
current tenure is consistent with a longer implicit search process that has not yet led to 
a switch from the current match. This increases the overall probability that the current 
match between a worker and a firm is among the best available in the labour market.  
 
There are other important variables that have a potential influence on on-the-job 
search. Empirical studies have demonstrated that there are workers’ characteristics 
such as age, sex, marital status, and education that are important determinants of on-
the-job search. In addition, past job changes have been found to predict future 
separations (Munasinghe and Sigman, 2004). Controlling for past labour market 
behaviour may also help in obtaining a coefficient for tenure that is not affected by 
worker heterogeneity in the propensity to quit. 
 
In addition to the individual employees’ characteristics, we also include, among 
variables X, various characteristics of the workplace, like indicators of high 
performance work practices, plant size, industry, and the regional unemployment rate. 
A complete list of the variables is explained in detail in Section 3. 
 
2.2. Interaction of disamenities, dissatisfaction and intentions to quit  
 
The second model is formed in three steps. In the first step we explain K separate 
discrete measures of disamenities zj by variables X1. The latent disamenities zj* and 
their observation rule are 
 
zji* = X1iβ1j + ε1ji,  j=1,…,K 
zji = 1(zji*>0) 
 
In the second stage, dissatisfaction is explained by the realized disamenies zj and 
variables X2: 
 
di* = Σjγjzji + X2iβ2 + ε2i 
di = 1(di*>0) 
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where d* is latent dissatisfaction and d a binary measure of observed dissatisfaction. 
In the final stage, intentions to quit are explained by means of realized job 
dissatisfaction d and variables X3: 
 
qi* = δdi + X3iβ3 + ε3i 
qi = 1(qi*>0) 
 
where q* is latent intention and q a binary indicator for observed intentions to quit. 
 
It is assumed that in all stages there are unobserved individual characteristics and 
therefore the error terms of the different stages are correlated. The unobserved 
individual characteristics can, for example, be attitudinal factors stressed in the 
psychological literature on mobility and individual characteristics that affect 
occupational choice. The K+2 equations form a system of discrete dependent variable 
models with endogenous dummy explanatory variables. However, the system is 
recursive, i.e. intentions to quit do not explain disamenities or satisfaction, and 
satisfaction does not explain disamenities. Therefore, the model can be estimated as a 
multivariate probit model (see Greene, 2003). We use the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-
Keane (GHK) simulated maximum likelihood estimator implemented to Stata by 
Cappelari and Jenkins (2003). 
 
To identify the model it is necessary that the variables X1, X2, and X3 are not the 
same. In X1 we include occupation and industry dummies that do not appear in the 
other equations, and some characteristics of the workplace, like plant size, which may 
also appear in the other equations. In X2 we include personal characteristics and some 
workplace characteristics. Finally, X3 comprises wages and variables that are related 
to the individual, but not included in X2, like the past history of job changes. The last 
equation therefore gives, in principle, the wage-satisfaction trade-off. The choice of 
the particular variables partly follows the discussion in section 2.1. above. 
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3. The data 
 
The data set that we are using in this study is the Quality of Work Life Survey 
(QWLS) of Statistics Finland. It is conducted at irregular intervals. We use the data 
from the year 1997. The initial sample for QWLS is derived from a monthly Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) of Statistics Finland, where a random sample of the working age 
population is selected for a telephone interview. The 1997 QWLS was based on LFS 
respondents in September and October who were 15-64-old wage and salary earners 
with a normal weekly working time of at least five hours. 3795 individuals were 
selected for the QWLS sample and invited to participate in a personal face-to-face 
interview. Out of this sample, 2978 persons, or around 78 per cent, participated (see 
Lehto and Sutela, 1999). Owing to missing information on some variables for some 
workers, the sample size used in this study is around 2750 observations.  
 
The QWLS survey contains a number of questions about the subjective views of 
workers with respect to their working conditions, as well as about the perceived job 
satisfaction. In addition, QWLS includes information on the personal characteristics 
and work experience of the respondents. Statistics Finland supplements QWLS with 
information from the LFS on, for example, working time and exact labour market 
status. Supplementary information on the industry and location of the employer as 
well as annual earnings and the level and field of education of the respondents was 
gathered from various registers maintained by Statistics Finland. The variables that 
we are using are described in detail in Appendix 1, and Appendix 2 reports 
descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables included. 
 
The phenomena that we are interested in explaining are workers’ intentions to quit 
and on-the-job search. We have information on those who would change jobs within 
the same occupational field, if they could receive the same pay as now (23.5 per cent 
of employees), and on those who would switch to another occupational field (24.9 per 
cent). From these measures we can derive an indicator of intentions to quit, 
JOBSWITCH, which is the sum of the two sub-cases (48.4 per cent). Our second 
measure of quit intentions relates to a hypothetical situation where the respondents 
received so much money from, for example, a lottery or an inheritance that they could 
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live without having to work. LOTTOSTOP is an indicator for those who would in this 
situation stop working completely (18.8 per cent of employees). The other alternatives 
were to only do some work every now and then, to work considerably shorter hours, 
and to continue working as now.2 
 
As to actual job search behaviour, we have three measures. JOBSEARCH is a dummy 
variable that indicates that the employee has looked for another job at some stage 
during the last six months (15.1 per cent of the employees).3 SEARCH4 is a dummy 
for employees that have searched for a job during the last four weeks (6.3 per cent of 
employees). EMPLOFFICE is a dummy for being a registered job seeker in an 
employment office (6.8 per cent). There are some inconsistencies between the 
measures that capture actual job search. For example, among those that report having 
looked for another job in the last four weeks 14.8 per cent say that they have not 
looked for another job in the last six months. There are two explanations for this. It is 
possible that some respondents have thought that six months is “the last six months, 
not accounting for the last four weeks”. Another explanation is that the JOBSEARCH 
variable comes from the QWLS questionnaire filled in during a personal interview, 
whereas the SEARCH4 variable comes from the LFS telephone survey. It is possible 
that in the different survey environments the respondents have received somewhat 
different information on the time periods that the questions deal with or have 
forgotten what they answered in the LFS survey (which is conducted before QWLS). 
Another inconsistency is that among those registered as job seekers in an employment 
office 60 per cent have not been looking for another job in the last four weeks and 48 
per cent not in the last six months. It is likely that many of those registered as job 
seekers in an employment office are actually not active job seekers. Therefore it 
seems that the employment office variable is a less reliable measure of workers’ 
intentions to quit than the job search variables. 
 
These job switch intention and job search intention measures can be compared with 
actual job switches. Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2003) report that the separation rate in 
the Finnish business sector varied between 17 and 28 per cent in the 1990s. These 
figures underestimate actual turnover, since they are based on comparisons of end-of-
the-year situations at the plant level. Hence, they do not account for short employment 
spells within the year, i.e. hiring and separation of a person during the same year. On 
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the other hand, they include both quits and layoffs, thereby overestimating quits. It is 
therefore difficult to tell what the actual proportion of workers quitting is, but it is safe 
to say that the actual quit rate is below the share of workers intending to switch jobs 
or actually searching for a new job. 
 
The subjective valuations of harms and hazards related to working conditions are 
measured in the QWLS survey by the use of different categories. For perceived 
harms, there is a five-point scale in which the highest category corresponds to the 
perception by a worker that a feature of working conditions is ‘very much’ an adverse 
factor at the workplace. For perceived hazards, the highest category among three 
possibilities is the one in which the respondent considers a feature at the workplace as 
‘a distinct hazard’. Responses to the questions about adverse working conditions can 
be aggregated by forming a dummy variable that equals one if there is at least one 
clearly adverse factor (HARM) and a dummy that equals one if there is at least one 
distinct hazard (HAZARD). These variables seem to capture different aspects at 
Finnish workplaces, as implied by the relative small correlation of 0.31 that prevails 
between these two key variables that are used to describe adverse working conditions.  
 
We use the following dummy variables as other job disamenities. UNCERTAINTY 
tells us that there is at least one clear insecurity factor at the workplace, NOVOICE 
implies that there is at least one aspect of work that the worker cannot influence at all, 
NEGLECT is a dummy for the existence of at least one aspect where the worker gets 
no support from superiors, ATMOSPHERE tells us that the worker experiences at 
least one negative aspect in the work atmosphere almost daily, and CONFLICTS is a 
dummy for at least one type of conflict that is often experienced at the workplace. 
Additionally, we have dummy variables for physically or mentally very demanding 
work (HEAVYPHYSIC and HEAVYMENTAL, respectively), poor advancement 
opportunities (NOPROMOTION), discrimination at the workplace 
(DISCRIMINATION), difficulty of taking breaks (NOBREAK), and for working 
mostly outdoors (OUTDOORS). 
 
Job dissatisfaction is measured by the alternatives 1 (very satisfied; 30.6 per cent of 
respondents), 2 (quite satisfied; 63.1 per cent), 3 (rather dissatisfied; 5.3 per cent), and 
4 (very dissatisfied; 1 per cent). We form a dissatisfaction dummy 
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(JOBDISSATISFACTION) that indicates the two highest dissatisfaction categories 3 
and 4. The WAGE variable is a logarithm of hourly earnings. 
 
We include a large set of control variables. There are variables that describe the 
employment relationship, pay system, and high performance work practices. We 
include dummy variables for working-time-related aspects, like temporary contract 
(TEMPORARY), part-time work (PART_TIME), night work (NIGHT), shift work 
(SHIFT), and overtime almost daily (MUCHOVERTIME), and for the payment 
system (FIXEDPAY, PIECERATE). On-the-job training is measured by the number 
of days in training (DAYSTRAINING). Other dummies give an indication of working 
a high share of time in teamwork (HIGHTEAM), team-related problems 
(TEAMPROBLEM), and managerial tasks (MANAGER). 
 
There are typical human capital variables that are age and its square (AGE and 
AGE2), and dummies for females (FEMALE), union membership (UNION), marital 
status (SINGLE), working spouse (SPOUSEWORK), level of education (dummies 
EDU_1 to EDU_4), and field of education (dummies EDUHUM, EDUBUS, 
EDUTECH, EDUCARE). The number of children is included as a continuous 
variable (CHILDREN). In addition, we include work history variables, a dummy for 
those that have had over 3 different occupations (OVER3PROFS), the number of job 
switches (SWITCHES) in the past, the unemployment history of a worker (dummies 
UMOS_1 to UMOS_4 for the length of past unemployment), tenure and its square 
(TENURE and TENURE2), a dummy for second job holders (SECONDJOB), and 
dummies for 10 occupation groups. 
  
There is some information available on the health of the worker, the number of 
absences (SICKABSENCE) and self-assessment of work capacity (CONDITION, in 
scale 0 to 10). Information on the employer includes dummies for the public sector 
and foreign private owners (PUBLIC, FIRMFOREIGN), plant size group (dummies 
PSIZE_1 to PSIZE_4), and dummies for employment growth (EMPGROWTH), 
unstable financial situation (FIRMUNSTABLE), and the high share of female 
workers (FEMSHARE). Finally, we include industry dummies (14 industries), and the 
regional unemployment rate (UN) for capturing the possible regional variation. 
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4. The results 
 
4.1. Basic results 
 
We estimated probit models for workers’ intentions to quit from their current 
matches, their willingness to stop working completely, and actual on-the-job search. 
The marginal effects from the models are reported in Tables 1 and 2. The results 
reveal that workers currently facing adverse working conditions tend to have more 
intentions to change their matches. In particular, those workers are more willing to 
change their jobs (holding wage constant) who face at least one notable harm or factor 
of uncertainty, have mentally heavy work, feel that they have no promotion chances 
or face discrimination (Table 1, column 1).4 Workers who have at least one notable 
hazard at the workplace, feel neglect or a bad working atmosphere, have mentally 
heavy work, or have team-work-related problems are more willing to stop working 
completely if they win in a lottery (Table 1, column 2). Moreover, the marginal 
effects are quite large. For example, those having clear harms at the workplace have a 
5.7 per cent higher probability of having job switch intentions. Uncertainty, poor 
promotion prospects, and discrimination all lead to at least an 8 per cent higher 
probability of intentions to quit. 
 
In addition, workers currently facing adverse working conditions tend to search new 
matches more frequently (Table 2, columns 1-2). Uncertainty, poor promotion 
chances, and discrimination have a clear positive impact on both job search variables. 
Job search during the last six months is also affected by the feel of neglect and job 
search during the last four weeks by perceived harms and the difficulty of taking 
breaks. In contrast, the results for the employment office variable show no clear 
empirical evidence for the role of adverse working conditions, since only the 
uncertainty variable obtains a significant coefficient. However, as discussed in the 
earlier section, this particular variable is probably not a good measure of workers’ quit 
behaviour. The marginal effects of the disamenity variables on actual job search are 
lower than on job switch intentions, as could be expected. In addition, the pseudo R2 
of the models is higher for the models in which actual on-the-job search is explained. 
This means that unobservable idiosyncratic factors are more important in the 
determination of intentions. 
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All in all, the results are in line with the perspective that labour markets are in 
disequilibrium at any given point of time in the sense that workers located in adverse 
working conditions are forced to look for outside opportunities in order to improve 
their labour market position. This is inconsistent with the existence of adequate 
compensating wage differentials for adverse working conditions, but consistent with 
frictions and non-competitive labour markets.  
 
=== TABLES 1 and 2 HERE === 
 
We briefly summarize some interesting results on the control variables included. 
Against a priori beliefs, workers with higher hourly wages have more intentions for 
changing their jobs, and holding their current wage constant (Table 1, column 1). This 
result may arise, for example, because there are certain unobservable disamenities in 
high-paying occupations that are not captured in the questions by the QWLS. 
However, in the job search equations (Table 2, columns 1-2) wage has a significant 
negative coefficient.5  
 
Singles have more intentions of changing their jobs, because their labour market 
behaviour is not restricted by family-related reasons. Also, those whose spouses work 
are more inclined to switch jobs. These variables are also significant in the equation 
for job search during the last four weeks. More educated workers are less willing to 
stop working completely (the model for LOTTOSTOP). In this sense, money seems to 
matter less for them, compared with the content of work. Education has, however, a 
positive impact on actual job search. It is likely that more educated workers have 
more opportunities in the labour market. Workers who assess themselves to be in a 
good condition to work are more inclined to search for a new job, but interestingly 
they are less likely to have job switch intentions or to stop working completely. 
 
Work history seems to matter, although the results vary somewhat across models. 
Tenure has an inverted U-shaped effect on job switch intentions, but it is not 
significant in the other models. Previous changes in occupation and previous job 
switches predict current on-the-job search, which is in accordance with the hobo 
syndrome reported by Munasinghe and Sigman (2004). Workers with temporary 
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contracts and part-time workers search for new jobs more frequently, and part-timers 
also have more job switch intentions.6 Unemployment experiences are positively 
related to job search through an employment office, as expected. 
 
Workers in foreign-owned companies and in companies that are financially unstable 
have more job switch intentions. The only other significant firm or plant variables are 
dummies for smaller plants. They obtain negative coefficients in the equation for 
search through an employment office. This indicates that workers in smaller firms 
may be more inclined to use informal job search channels or that in larger firms there 
are more workers at an risk of layoff and therefore registered at an employment 
office.  
 
Workers search less in regional labour markets with a high unemployment rate. This 
may be a sign of the discouraged worker effect.7 However, workers seem to search 
more from employment offices in high unemployment regions at the same time. On 
the other hand, unemployment does not have an effect on job switch intentions. 
 
Overall, the results vary across the models. This shows that our different measures of 
intentions to quit describe slightly different kinds of labour market behaviour. 
However, the influence of working conditions is more consistent across the models 
than the impact of specific worker or firm characteristics. 
 
4.2. Results from recursive models 
 
We estimated the recursive models by concentrating on the three work disamenities 
that had the most consistently significant effect in the basic models in the previous 
section. These are HARM, HAZARD, and UNCERTAINTY. Furthermore, we 
estimated three-equation models where only one disamenity at a time was included. 
We also estimated models with two or three disamenities at the same time, but the 
results are not shown in the table and we only briefly discuss them below. Finally, we 
estimated the multivariate probit model separately for four alternative quit intention 
measures, excluding the employment office variable. 
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In all the models the explanatory variables for the disamenity (HARM, HAZARD, or 
UNCERTAINTY) were occupation dummies (10), PUBLIC, FIRMFOREIGN, 
PSIZE_2 to PSIZE_4, FIRMUNSTABLE, and industry dummies (14). The variables 
in the JOBDISSATISFACTION equation were the disamenity in question, WAGE, 
FEMALE, AGE, AGE2, EDU_2 to EDU_4, EDUHUM, EDUBUS, EDUTECH, 
EDUCARE, TENURE, TENURE2, FIXEDPAY, PIECERATE, PART_TIME, 
DAYSTRAINING, MANAGER and CONDITION. Finally, the quit intention 
variable (JOBSWITCH, LOTTOSTOP, JOBSEARCH, or SEARCH4) was explained 
by JOBDISSATISFACTION, WAGE, FEMALE, AGE, AGE2, OVER3PROFS, 
SWITCHES, CHILDREN, EDU_2 to EDU_4, TENURE, TENURE2, UMOS_1 to 
UMOS_4, TEMPORARY, PART_TIME and UN.  
 
The estimation results for the joint model for disamenities, dissatisfaction and quit 
behaviour based on multivariate probit models are summarized in Tables 3-5. The 
results are reported in the following way. We have three disamenity variables out of 
which only one at a time is included. On the other hand, we have four alternative quit 
intention variables. This means that we have 12 different models to estimate. The 
tables report the coefficients of the disamenities in the dissatisfaction equation (Table 
3), the coefficients of dissatisfaction in the quit intention equation (Table 4) and the 
coefficient of wage in the quit intention equation (Table 5). Each of the tables has 12 
entries, reflecting the different models estimated. The coefficients of the other 
explanatory variables are not reported in the tables. Note that the figures are the 
estimated coefficients, not the marginal effects, which would vary between different 
combinations of outcomes for quit intentions, dissatisfaction and disamenity. 
 
=== TABLES 3, 4 AND 5 HERE === 
 
The results reveal that job disamenities consistently increase the probability of job 
dissatisfaction and, in turn, it is job dissatisfaction that tends to increase the 
probability of job switch intentions and actual job search. For example, the HARM 
variable gets the coefficient 0.70 (with corresponding t-statistics of 3.48) in an 
equation in which job dissatisfaction is explained in the second stage. In the third 
stage of the same recursive model, a dummy variable for job dissatisfaction gets the 
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coefficient 0.85 (with corresponding t-statistics of 5.13) in an equation in which the 
JOBSWITCH variable is explained. This means that the prevalence of perceived 
harms at the workplace increases job dissatisfaction among employees and job 
dissatisfaction drives workers’ quit intentions. The results for the other disamenity 
and quit intention variables are fairly similar. 
 
We also estimated the models by including equations for two of the job disamenity 
variables at the same time. In this case, we had to estimate four probit models as a 
recursive system. These results showed that job disamenities consistently increase the 
level of job dissatisfaction. In addition, we included all three disamenity variables 
(HARM, HAZARD and UNCERTAINTY) in the model at the same time. In this 
extension the UNCERTAINTY variable turned out to be statistically insignificant in 
the dissatisfaction equation, but otherwise the results remained the same. 
 
The results of the wage variable in Table 5 reveal the same pattern as earlier. Wage 
obtains a significant negative coefficient for job search equations (JOBSEARCH and 
SEARCH4), but its coefficient is positive in the JOBSWITCH equation and 
insignificant in the LOTTOSTOP equation. Moreover, the coefficients of the wage 
variable are relatively low even in the search models. In principle, we could use the 
coefficients of wage and dissatisfaction in the search equations to evaluate the 
monetary value of job satisfaction, i.e. wage compensation that would be needed to 
compensate for dissatisfaction to keep the probability of job search constant (see e.g. 
Herzog and Schottman, 1990). However, the figure calculated in this way is too large 
to be a reasonable estimate. (The coefficients of dissatisfaction in column 3 of Table 4 
are approximately ten times the absolute value of the corresponding coefficients of 
(log) wage in column 3 of Table 5.) It is likely that the discrete nature of the 
dissatisfaction variable makes it difficult to estimate the exact monetary value of 
dissatisfaction.8 
 
5.   Conclusions 
 
This study has explored the role of adverse working conditions for on-the-job search 
in the Finnish labour market. We took advantage of the Quality of Work Life Survey, 
which includes not only job satisfaction scores, but also detailed information on 
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several different aspects of working conditions at the workplace, not just conditions 
typical of the occupation or industry. The evidence points out that those workers 
facing adverse working conditions have more job switch intentions and they are more 
willing to stop working completely, if they win in a lottery. In addition, those workers 
search for a new job more frequently. However, the other determinants of the 
alternative measure of quit intentions vary, showing that they represent different kinds 
of search processes. The results from recursive models reveal that adverse working 
conditions increase the level of job dissatisfaction and, in turn, it is the perception of 
job dissatisfaction that drives workers’ job change intentions and intensifies actual job 
search. The results emerge despite the fact the unemployment rate was high (12.7 per 
cent) during the year in which the survey was conducted, which discourages workers’ 
intentions to quit. 
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Table 1. Probit marginal effects on intentions to switch jobs or stop working 
completely. 
 
 JOBSWITCH LOTTOSTOP 
WAGE 0.020 0.000 
 (1.77)* (0.05) 
HARM 0.057 -0.009 
 (2.32)** (0.50) 
HAZARD 0.012 0.043 
 (0.50) (2.57)** 
UNCERTAINTY 0.087 -0.010 
 (3.98)*** (0.65) 
NOVOICE 0.037 0.025 
 (1.55) (1.43) 
NEGLECT 0.050 0.049 
 (1.89)* (2.60)*** 
ATMOSPHERE 0.001 0.066 
 (0.04) (2.71)*** 
CONFLICTS 0.038 -0.036 
 (0.90) (1.24) 
HEAVYPHYSIC 0.053 0.058 
 (1.09) (1.62) 
HEAVYMENTAL 0.087 0.102 
 (2.06)** (3.02)*** 
NOPROMOTION 0.080 0.026 
 (3.53)*** (1.61) 
DISCRIMINATION 0.093 -0.007 
 (4.08)*** (0.42) 
NOBREAKS -0.001 -0.035 
 (0.04) (1.48) 
OUTDOORS 0.016 -0.016 
 (0.33) (0.50) 
TEMPORARY 0.043 -0.020 
 (1.24) (0.78) 
PART_TIME -0.060 0.011 
 (1.65)* (0.41) 
NIGHT 0.051 0.070 
 (0.50) (0.98) 
SHIFT -0.007 -0.001 
 (0.14) (0.04) 
MUCHOVERTIME 0.012 0.004 
 (0.23) (0.11) 
FIXEDPAY 0.019 -0.019 
 (0.61) (0.88) 
PIECERATE 0.093 -0.049 
 (1.35) (1.11) 
DAYSTRAINING -0.010 0.001 
 (0.46) (0.04) 
HIGHTEAM -0.029 -0.002 
 (1.19) (0.10) 
TEAMPROBLEM -0.006 0.029 
 (0.29) (1.75)* 
MANAGER 0.021 -0.011 
 (0.86) (0.63) 
FEMALE 0.009 -0.009 
 (0.32) (0.42) 
AGE 0.010 -0.006 
 (1.27) (1.07) 
AGE2 -0.000 0.000 
 (1.99)** (1.58) 
UNION -0.037 0.016 
 (1.31) (0.79) 
SINGLE 0.099 -0.033 
 (3.04)*** (1.38) 
SPOUSEWORK 0.048 0.004 
 (1.98)** (0.22) 
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EDU_2 -0.018 -0.054 
 (0.51) (2.19)** 
EDU_3 0.071 -0.122 
 (1.45) (4.21)*** 
EDU_4 0.061 -0.122 
 (1.10) (3.79)*** 
EDUHUM 0.077 -0.005 
 (1.38) (0.11) 
EDUBUS 0.063 -0.018 
 (1.72)* (0.65) 
EDUTECH 0.066 0.045 
 (1.86)* (1.67)* 
EDUCARE -0.007 -0.032 
 (0.15) (0.92) 
OVER3PROFS -0.028 0.036 
 (0.89) (1.59) 
SWITCHES 0.009 0.004 
 (1.34) (0.67) 
UMOS_1 0.023 0.004 
 (0.71) (0.16) 
UMOS_2 0.008 0.033 
 (0.17) (0.98) 
UMOS_3 -0.015 -0.010 
 (0.30) (0.29) 
UMOS_4 -0.031 0.026 
 (0.54) (0.61) 
TENURE 0.008 0.005 
 (1.81)* (1.57) 
TENURE2 -0.000 -0.000 
 (2.96)*** (0.61) 
SECONDJOB -0.060 -0.025 
 (1.05) (0.58) 
SICKABSENCE -0.007 0.005 
 (0.76) (0.88) 
CONDITION -0.016 -0.019 
 (1.93)* (3.49)*** 
PUBLIC 0.046 0.014 
 (1.18) (0.52) 
FIRMFOREIGN 0.110 0.006 
 (2.69)*** (0.20) 
PSIZE_2 -0.005 0.020 
 (0.19) (1.05) 
PSIZE_3 -0.023 0.014 
 (0.75) (0.63) 
PSIZE_4 0.000 -0.024 
 (0.00) (0.80) 
EMPGROWTH -0.006 -0.022 
 (0.19) (0.93) 
FIRMUNSTABLE 0.062 -0.002 
 (2.14)** (0.08) 
FEMSHARE 0.029 0.019 
 (1.03) (0.92) 
UN -0.001 0.002 
 (0.58) (1.46) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.13 
Observations 2753 2753 
Absolute values of robust z statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 2. Probit marginal effects on actual on-the-job search.  
 
 JOBSEARCH SEARCH4 EMPLOFFICE 
WAGE -0.015 -0.006 0.001 
 (3.08)*** (2.28)** (0.68) 
HARM 0.015 0.019 -0.001 
 (1.23) (2.58)*** (0.17) 
HAZARD 0.017 0.000 0.003 
 (1.38) (0.02) (0.62) 
UNCERTAINTY 0.026 0.015 0.013 
 (2.31)** (2.43)** (2.69)*** 
NOVOICE -0.000 0.005 0.007 
 (0.04) (0.68) (1.44) 
NEGLECT 0.037 0.006 0.003 
 (2.66)*** (0.84) (0.56) 
ATMOSPHERE 0.014 0.012 -0.007 
 (0.75) (1.10) (1.10) 
CONFLICTS 0.020 -0.000 -0.007 
 (0.90) (0.00) (0.74) 
HEAVYPHYSIC -0.019 -0.012 -0.001 
 (0.89) (1.18) (0.06) 
HEAVYMENTAL 0.001 0.014 -0.005 
 (0.06) (1.07) (0.49) 
NOPROMOTION 0.047 0.016 0.006 
 (4.23)*** (2.63)*** (1.16) 
DISCRIMINATION 0.063 0.012 0.001 
 (5.16)*** (1.83)* (0.28) 
NOBREAKS 0.016 0.019 0.005 
 (0.92) (1.73)* (0.71) 
OUTDOORS -0.007 0.017 0.005 
 (0.29) (1.10) (0.54) 
TEMPORARY 0.075 0.038 0.056 
 (4.26)*** (3.61)*** (6.06)*** 
PART_TIME 0.064 0.035 0.081 
 (3.28)*** (3.25)*** (7.16)*** 
SHIFT -0.002 0.000 0.019 
 (0.07) (0.04) (1.51) 
MUCHOVERTIME -0.039 -0.014 -0.008 
 (1.95)* (1.33) (0.85) 
FIXEDPAY 0.021 -0.009 -0.005 
 (1.33) (0.97) (0.62) 
PIECERATE -0.016 -0.015 0.018 
 (0.47) (1.05) (1.11) 
DAYSTRAINING 0.011 -0.006 -0.004 
 (1.00) (0.92) (0.95) 
HIGHTEAM 0.005 -0.003 0.002 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.35) 
TEAMPROBLEM -0.006 -0.005 0.002 
 (0.54) (0.75) (0.42) 
MANAGER 0.006 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.45) (0.13) (0.04) 
FEMALE -0.027 -0.008 0.014 
 (1.82)* (1.05) (2.12)** 
AGE 0.010 0.001 0.000 
 (2.26)** (0.49) (0.17) 
AGE2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (2.93)*** (0.74) (0.24) 
UNION 0.005 -0.003 -0.011 
 (0.38) (0.40) (1.77)* 
SINGLE 0.014 0.026 -0.009 
 (0.84) (2.35)** (1.66)* 
SPOUSEWORK -0.002 0.015 -0.009 
 (0.18) (2.11)** (1.84)* 
EDU_2 0.018 0.023 -0.008 
 (1.01) (2.47)** (1.06) 
EDU_3 0.055 0.053 -0.006 
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 (1.95)* (2.71)*** (0.69) 
EDU_4 0.036 0.041 -0.011 
 (1.13) (1.86)* (0.97) 
EDUHUM 0.005 -0.002 0.015 
 (0.19) (0.13) (1.00) 
EDUBUS 0.016 0.005 0.003 
 (0.89) (0.51) (0.36) 
EDUTECH 0.007 -0.004 0.009 
 (0.40) (0.51) (1.09) 
EDUCARE 0.021 -0.012 -0.001 
 (0.84) (1.05) (0.16) 
OVER3PROFS 0.040 0.009 0.003 
 (2.50)** (1.06) (0.53) 
SWITCHES 0.015 0.001 -0.002 
 (3.94)*** (0.83) (1.95)* 
UMOS_1 0.004 0.004 0.015 
 (0.29) (0.51) (1.88)* 
UMOS_2 -0.012 -0.003 0.052 
 (0.61) (0.28) (4.06)*** 
UMOS_3 -0.003 0.024 0.068 
 (0.14) (1.80)* (4.49)*** 
UMOS_4 -0.014 0.026 0.064 
 (0.58) (1.58) (3.74)*** 
TENURE -0.000 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.05) (0.06) (2.30)** 
TENURE2 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (1.57) (0.90) (1.90)* 
SECONDJOB 0.013 0.003 -0.011 
 (0.42) (0.18) (1.29) 
SICKABSENCE -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 
 (1.11) (1.64) (0.68) 
CONDITION 0.010 0.004 0.003 
 (2.15)** (1.66)* (1.86)* 
PUBLIC -0.025 -0.004 -0.003 
 (1.43) (0.43) (0.34) 
FIRMFOREIGN -0.012 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.59) (0.00) (0.12) 
PSIZE_2 -0.009 -0.004 -0.009 
 (0.75) (0.61) (1.98)** 
PSIZE_3 -0.013 -0.010 -0.013 
 (0.90) (1.29) (2.41)** 
PSIZE_4 -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 
 (0.03) (0.10) (0.88) 
EMPGROWTH 0.004 -0.008 -0.010 
 (0.25) (0.93) (1.42) 
FIRMUNSTABLE 0.009 -0.004 0.000 
 (0.62) (0.57) (0.04) 
FEMSHARE 0.004 0.006 0.002 
 (0.28) (0.75) (0.43) 
UN -0.004 -0.002 0.001 
 (3.44)*** (3.10)*** (1.74)* 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.21 0.36 
Observations 2747 2712 2712 
Absolute values of robust z statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
The variable NIGHT is not included in these models, because it predicts the SEARCH4 variable 
perfectly. 
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Table 3. Effect of job disamenities on job dissatisfaction. 
  
 
Coefficient of job disamenity in the job dissatisfaction equation 
 Dependent variable in quit intention equation 
Dependent variable in 
job disamenity 
equation 
JOBSWITCH LOTTOSTOP JOBSEARCH SEARCH4 
HARM 0.696 
(3.48)*** 
0.715 
(3.69)*** 
0.695 
(3.49)*** 
0.694 
(3.50)*** 
     
HAZARD 0.569 
(3.00)*** 
0.578 
(3.12)*** 
0.553 
(2.93)*** 
0.572 
(3.04)*** 
     
UNCERTAINTY 0.817 
(4.47)*** 
0.798 
(4.40)*** 
0.804 
(4.38)*** 
0.807 
(4.42)*** 
Robust z statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Each cell of the table reports the coefficient of job disamenity in the job dissatisfaction equation from a 
different specification of the multivariate probit model. The variables included are explained in the 
text. 
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Table 4. Effect of job dissatisfaction on intentions to quit. 
 
 
Coefficient of job dissatisfaction in the quit intention equation 
 Dependent variable in quit intention equation 
Dependent variable in 
job disamenity 
equation 
JOBSWITCH LOTTOSTOP JOBSEARCH SEARCH4 
HARM 0.852 
(5.13)*** 
0.706 
(4.05)*** 
1.139 
(5.89)*** 
0.977 
(3.92)*** 
     
HAZARD 0.865 
(5.21)*** 
0.635 
(3.60)*** 
1.071 
(5.47)*** 
0.969 
(3.89)*** 
     
UNCERTAINTY 0.887 
(5.42)*** 
0.689 
(3.95)*** 
1.142 
(6.02)*** 
1.963 
(3.88)*** 
Robust z statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Each cell of the table reports the coefficient of job dissatisfaction in the job mobility equation from a 
different specification of the multivariate probit model. The variables included are explained in the 
text. 
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Table 5. Effect of wage on intentions to quit. 
 
 
Coefficient of wage in the quit intention equation 
 Dependent variable in quit intention equation 
Dependent variable in 
job disamenity 
equation 
JOBSWITCH LOTTOSTOP JOBSEARCH SEARCH4 
HARM 0.054 
(2.00)** 
0.016 
(0.45) 
 
-0.106 
(3.44)*** 
-0.105 
(2.86)*** 
     
HAZARD 0.055 
(2.03)** 
0.014 
(0.40) 
-0.106 
(3.45)*** 
-0.105 
(2.85)*** 
     
UNCERTAINTY 0.053 
(1.97)** 
0.016 
(0.45) 
-0.107 
(3.48)*** 
-0.106 
(2.90)*** 
Absolute values of robust z statistics in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Each cell of the table reports the coefficient of wage in the job mobility equation from a different 
specification of the multivariate probit model. The variables included are explained in the text. 
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Appendix 1. Description of the variables. 
 
Variable Definition/measurement  
  
Job switch intentions:  
  
JOBSWITCH Would change jobs at the same level of pay = 1, otherwise = 0  (sum of SWITCHSAME and 
SWITCHOTHER) 
SWITCHSAME If could change jobs at the same level of pay, would change to the same occupational field = 1, otherwise = 0 
SWITCHOTHER If could change jobs at the same level of pay, would change to a different occupational field = 1, otherwise = 0 
LOTTOSTOP If received so much money from, for example, a lottery win or inheritance that could live comfortably without 
having to work, would stop working completely = 1, otherwise = 0 
  
Actual on-the-job search:  
  
JOBSEARCH Has looked for another job in the last 6 months = 1, otherwise = 0  
SEARCH4 Has looked for another job during the last four weeks = 1, otherwise = 0 
EMPLOFFICE Currently registered as job seeker at an employment office = 1, otherwise = 0 
  
Working conditions: 
  
HARM  At least one adverse factor that affects work ‘very much’ (includes heat, cold, vibration, draught, noise, 
smoke, gas and fumes, humidity, dry indoor air, dust, dirtiness of work environment, poor or glaring lighting, 
irritating or corrosive substances, restless work environment, repetitive, monotonous movements, difficult or 
uncomfortable working positions, time pressure and tight time schedules, heavy lifting, lack of space, mildew 
in buildings) = 1, otherwise = 0 
HAZARD At least one factor is experienced as ‘a distinct hazard’ (includes accident risk, becoming subject to physical 
violence, hazards caused by chemical substances, radiation hazard, major catastrophe hazard, hazard of 
infectious diseases, hazard of skin diseases, cancer risk, risk of strain injuries, risk of succumbing to mental 
disturbance, risk of grave work exhaustion, risk of causing serious injury to others, risk of causing serious 
damage to valuable equipment or product) = 1, otherwise = 0 
UNCERTAINTY Work carries at least one insecurity factor (includes transfer to other duties, threat of temporary dismissal, 
threat of permanent dismissal, threat of unemployment, threat of becoming incapable of work, unforeseen 
changes) = 1, otherwise = 0 
NOVOICE ‘Not at all’ able to influence at least one factor in work (includes contents of tasks, order in which tasks are 
done, pace of work, working methods, division of tasks between employees, choice of working partners, 
equipment purchases) = 1, otherwise = 0 
NEGLECT At least one supportive factor ‘never’ experienced in work (includes advice or help, support and 
encouragement from superiors, support and encouragement from co-workers, feel of being a valued member 
of work community, opportunity to plan work, opportunity to apply own ideas in work, feel of own work as 
productive and useful) = 1, otherwise = 0 
ATMOSPHERE Experiences at least one negative aspect of work atmosphere ‘daily or almost daily’ or positive aspect ‘never’ 
(includes negative aspects conflicts or argument with someone else in work community or with a customer, 
being subject or threatened by physical violence, use of unfriendly words or gestures by co-workers or 
superiors, and positive aspects praise for work from co-workers or customers, opportunities for learning new 
things and developing in one’s occupation) = 1, otherwise = 0 
CONFLICTS At least one type of conflict appears in work unit ‘a lot’ (includes competitive spirit, conflicts between 
superiors and subordinates, conflicts between employees, conflicts between employee groups) = 1, otherwise 
= 0 
HEAVYPHYSIC Current tasks physically ‘very demanding’ = 1, otherwise = 0 
HEAVYMENTAL Current tasks mentally ‘very demanding’ = 1, otherwise = 0 
NOPROMOTION Advancement opportunities in current workplace ‘poor’ = 1, otherwise = 0 
DISCRIMINATION Has fallen subject to at least one type of unequal treatment or discrimination in current workplace (includes 
time of hiring, remuneration, career advancement opportunities, access to training arranged by employer, 
receiving information, attitudes of co-workers or superiors) = 1, otherwise = 0  
NOBREAKS Can take breaks or rest periods ‘far too seldom’ = 1, otherwise = 0 
OUTDOORS Does principally outdoor work = 1, otherwise = 0 
  
Job satisfaction:  
  
JOBDISSATISFACTION Job dissatisfaction is measured by means of alternatives 1 (very satisfied), 2 (quite satisfied), 3 (rather 
dissatisfied), and 4 (very dissatisfied). The JOBDISSATISFACTION variable gets value one for the two 
highest dissatisfaction categories 3 and 4, otherwise = 0. 
  
Wage:  
  
WAGE Logarithm of hourly earnings that is calculated based on the annual earnings (FIM) obtained from tax 
registers and by using regular weekly hours from LFS. 
  
Working time: 
  
TEMPORARY Fixed-term employment relationship = 1, otherwise = 0 
PART_TIME Part-time work = 1, otherwise = 0 
NIGHT Night work = 1, otherwise = 0 
SHIFT Uninterrupted 3-shift work = 1, otherwise  = 0 
MUCHOVERTIME Does almost daily overtime for which receives compensation = 1, otherwise = 0 
  
Payment systems: 
  
FIXEDPAY Fixed monthly or hourly pay (including shift work supplement) = 1, otherwise = 0 
PIECERATE Payment system is based on only piece-work or commission pay = 1, otherwise = 0 
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Training and work organization: 
  
DAYSTRAINING Number of days attended courses while being paid by employer during the last 12 months  
HIGHTEAM Works in teams ‘almost all the time’ or ‘about three quarters of the time’ = 1, otherwise = 0 
TEAMPROBLEM There is at least one problematic aspect in the work group (includes ‘totally untrue’ that group selects its 
leader, group decides about division of responsibilities, productiviness of work improves in group work, or 
work pressure becomes evenly distributed, and ‘totally true’ that group work causes conflicts) = 1, otherwise = 
0 
MANAGER Tasks involve supervision of work of others or delegation of tasks = 1, otherwise = 0 
  
Personal background characteristics: 
  
FEMALE 1 = female, 0 = male 
AGE Age of an employee 
AGE2 Age squared 
UNION Member of trade union = 1, otherwise = 0 
SINGLE Not married=1, otherwise=0 
SPOUSEWORK Spouse is working = 1, otherwise = 0 
CHILDREN The number of children under 18 living at home 
EDU_1 Comprehensive education = 1, otherwise = 0 (reference) 
EDU_2 Upper secondary or vocational education = 1, otherwise = 0 
EDU_3 Polytechnic or lower university degree = 1, otherwise = 0 
EDU_4 Higher university degree = 1, otherwise = 0 
EDUHUM Field of education is humanities or teachers’ education = 1, otherwise = 0 
EDUBUS Field of education is business, law or social science = 1, otherwise = 0  
EDUTECH Field of education is technical, natural science or computer science = 1, otherwise = 0 
EDUCARE Field of education is health care, social work, etc. = 1, otherwise = 0 
  
Past labour market experience: 
  
OVER3PROFS Has been in more than three distinctly different kinds of occupations during his/her life = 1, otherwise = 0 
SWITCHES Number of job switches during the past five years 
UMOS_1 Number of unemployment months during the past five years 1-6 = 1, otherwise = 0 
UMOS_2 Number of unemployment months during the past five years 7-12 = 1, otherwise = 0 
UMOS_3 Number of unemployment months during the past five years 13-24 = 1, otherwise = 0 
UMOS_4 Number of unemployment months during the past five years  25 or more = 1, otherwise = 0 
TENURE Number of years in the current firm 
TENURE2 TENURE squared 
SECONDJOB Has a second job = 1, otherwise = 0 
  
Health and absenteeism: 
  
SICKABSENCE Number of absences from work due to illness in the last 6 months 
CONDITION Self-assessment of working capacity. The variable is scaled from 0 (total inability to work) to 10 (top working 
capacity)  
  
Information about employer: 
  
PUBLIC  Employer is state or municipality = 1, otherwise  = 0 
FIRMFOREIGN Employer is private, mainly foreign-owned enterprise = 1, otherwise = 0 
PSIZE_1 Size of plant under 10 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 (reference) 
PSIZE_2 Size of plant 10-49 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 
PSIZE_3 Size of plant 50-499 employees = 1, otherwise = 0 
PSIZE_4 Size of plant over 499 employees = 1, otherwise = 0  
EMPGROWTH The number of employees has increased in the plant during the past three years = 1, otherwise = 0 
FIRMUNSTABLE Financial situation is ‘unstable’ = 1, otherwise = 0 
FEMSHARE Share of females in the company is ‘high’ = 1, otherwise  = 0 
  
Regional variable:  
  
UN The regional unemployment rate based on 21 NUTS3-regions (Source: Labour Force Survey by Statistics 
Finland). 
  
Dummy variables: 
  
Industries  14 dummies based on Standard Industry Classification 
Occupations  10 dummies based on the classification of occupations by Statistics Finland 
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Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics. 
 
MEAN STD
WAGE 3.787 6.671
FEMALE 0.531 0.499
AGE 39.710 10.496
UNION 0.792 0.406
SINGLE 0.175 0.380
  
SPOUSEWORK 0.559 0.497
CHILDREN 0.856 1.370
EDU_2 0.559 0.497
EDU_3 0.115 0.320
EDU_4 0.087 0.282
  
EDUHUM 0.061 0.239
EDUBUS 0.164 0.371
EDUTECH 0.269 0.443
EDUCARE 0.102 0.303
OVER3PROFS 0.130 0.336
  
SWITCHES 0.743 1.646
UMOS_1 0.138 0.345
UMOS_2 0.066 0.248
UMOS_3 0.061 0.240
UMOS_4 0.045 0.208
  
TENURE 9.545 9.290
SECONDJOB 0.031 0.172
FIXEDPAY 0.839 0.368
PIECERATE 0.025 0.157
TEMPORARY 0.180 0.385
  
PART_TIME 0.102 0.302
NIGHT 0.010 0.098
SHIFT 0.041 0.199
WEEKEND 0.003 0.052
MUCHOVERTIME 0.047 0.213
  
NOBREAKS 0.101 0.301
OUTDOORS 0.054 0.226
HARM 0.287 0.452
HAZARD 0.339 0.473
UNCERTAINTY 0.577 0.494
  
VOICE 0.675 0.468
NEGLECT 0.226 0.418
ATMOSPHERE 0.107 0.309
CONFLICTS 0.064 0.244
HEAVYPHYSIC 0.050 0.218
  
HEAVYMENTAL 0.065 0.246
TRAINING 0.465 0.499
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NOPROMOTION 0.622 0.485
DISCRIMINATION 0.299 0.458
HIGHTEAM 0.316 0.465
  
TEAMPROBLEM 0.415 0.493
MANAGER 0.317 0.465
SICKABSENCE 0.641 1.165
CONDITION 8.623 1.373
PUBLIC 0.343 0.475
  
FIRMFOREIGN 0.071 0.256
PSIZE_2 0.363 0.481
PSIZE_3 0.280 0.449
PSIZE_4 0.081 0.273
EMPGROWTH 0.108 0.311
  
FIRMUNSTABLE 0.159 0.365
FEMSHARE 0.405 0.491
UN 17.072 4.740
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1 In a choice model we could think that the latent quit intention was the difference of random utilities in 
another job and the present job. However, since we have data only on the attributes of the current job, it 
is difficult to justify the model with a random utility framework. 
 
2 We note that there are also some other possible job switch intention measures, like retirement 
intentions and aspirations to become an entrepreneur. Hyytinen and Ilmakunnas (2004) examine the 
determinants of entrepreneurial intentions using the QWLS data and find that job dissatisfaction 
increases entrepreneurial aspirations.  
 
3 In the job search and job switch intention questions missing observations have been interpreted to 
indicate that the respondent has not looked for a job or has no intentions to quit. Depending on the 
question, there were 4 – 16 such cases (0.1 – 0.5 per cent of observations). In the question of 
willingness to switch to the same or a different field, the answer “don’t know” was also interpreted as 
indicating that there were no intentions to quit. There were 65 such cases (2 per cent of the 
observations). In the “lottery” question there were 1 per cent of “don’t know” answers that were 
interpreted as “would not stop working”. 
 
4 We also experimented with alternative definitions of the disamenity variables. In our basic definition 
of perceived harm and hazard dummies the variables are equal to one if the worker reports at least one 
significant adverse factor at the workplace. A specification of the HARM and HAZARD variables as a 
sum of reported significant harms and hazards at the workplace also yields evidence that adverse 
working conditions increase workers’ intentions to quit. 
 
5 The wage plays a role in search behaviour in the labour market despite the fact that the Finnish wage 
distribution is highly compressed by its nature in comparison with many other European countries (see 
Moisala, 2004).  
 
6 These findings are in line with the literature. For example, Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) discover 
that temporary or part-time employment encourages on-the-job search by men but not women. In 
addition, skilled workers search more than the unskilled do in Britain. 
 
7 Kristensen and Westergård-Nielsen (2004) report for Denmark by using the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) that the level of average job satisfaction increases as there is an increase in 
unemployment. Thus, in addition to the discouraged worker effect, high unemployment should also 
yield fewer intentions to quit because an increase in the level of job satisfaction dampens workers’ quit 
behaviour.  
 
8 We also had access to the QWLS from the year 2003. However, we did not have information on 
annual earnings and some of the questions have slightly changed from the previous survey. We 
estimated recursive models with these data by using a self-reported wage category as the wage variable 
and a set of other variables that were as close to those used here as possible. The results were in 
accordance with those reported in this paper. 
